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Applicability of the Antitrust Laws
to the Securities Field*
Roy Nerenberg
INTRODUCTION
The process of balancing the separate demands of public concern con-
tamed in the antitrust laws' and the federal securities laws2 is both com-
plex and delicate. The antitrust laws serve the general objective of pro-
moting competition in open markets.3 Nevertheless, in certain areas of
regulated activity, exceptions or limitations upon the impact of the antitrust
laws have been imposed by Congress and the courts. Thus, in the fields
of transportation, communications, and other regulated industries, limita-
tions have been placed upon
the application of the antitrust
T-m AuTHoR (B.S., University of Pennsyl- laws. The securities laws, de-
vania, LL.B., Temple University) is an attorney
with the Office of the General Counsel, Se- signed to afford protection to
curities and Exchange Commission, and a mem- public investors through dis-
ber of the Pennsylvania Bar. closure and other requirements,
in some respects encourage
competition within and among securities markets. Although the scope
of the application of the antitrust laws to the securities field remains im-
precise, the existence of federal regulation has been pointed to as justify-
ing the exemption of certain practices from the antitrust laws.
The securities laws recognize the semi-monopolistic position of the
securities exchanges. The concept of self-regulation in the securities field
embodies certain inherently anticompetitive effects; philosophical limits
upon unchecked self-regulation are suggested by consideration of anti-
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.
1. The antitrust lavis consist of the Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. 551-7 (1958); the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. 55 41-58 (1958); and the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1958).
2. The federal securities laws include: the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Star. 74 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-mm (1958), as amended, Pub. L No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act]; the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1958), as amended, Pub. L No.
88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange Act];
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Star. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 55 80a-1
to -52 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2 to -74 (Supp. V, 1963) [hereinafter cited
as Investment Company Act].
3. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. AmNrTRUST REP. 1 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Afr'Y GEN.
REP.].
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trust principles.4 Current developments in each of these areas of the law,
notably the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange,' suggest new practical significance to the
accommodation of the objectives of the antitrust laws within the fabric
of federal securities regulation.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the general applicability of
the antitrust laws to the securities field, to briefly describe the areas in
which the antitrust laws and the federal securities laws may collide, and
to suggest means of generally dealing with the problems. Excluded from
the scope of comment are the antitrust and securities problems in connec-
tion with corporate mergerse and the antitrust implications of recent
mergers of brokerage firms.'
GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS:
THE IMPACT OF SELF-REGULATION
There is nothing novel about applying the antitrust laws to an indus-
try which is otherwise subject to governmental regulation or control.'
In the absence of some clear basis for immunity, the securities field, like
any other area of commerce, is subject to the restraints of the antitrust
laws. Neither the history nor the general scheme of the federal securi-
ties laws suggest that Congress intended to confer upon the securities field
any sweeping immunity from the coverage of the antitrust laws.'
It must be borne in mind that this whole statutory scheme was
worked out with the greatest care by members of the Congress
thoroughly aware of the antitrust problems, often in dose contact and
cooperation with those who were later to administer the intricate phases
of this well articulated and comprehensive plan of regulation of the se-
curities business, and in possession of the fruits of many prolonged and
4. Cary, Self Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244, 246 (1963).
5. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
6. See Bloom, Antitrust Aspects of Securities Regulation: Sherman Act 5 1 and 5 6 of the
Act of 1934; Clayton Act S 7 and Rule 133 Under the Act of 1933, 8 N.Y.L.F. 195 (1962).
7. Denniston, Justice Silent, Washington Evening Star, May 14, 1964, p. B-8, col. 6.
8. E.g., A r'Y GEN. REP. 261-93; Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUM.
L. RLv. 589 (1949); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control I; The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U.
PA. L REV. 641 (1958); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control II; Radio & Television Broad-
casting, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1959); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control III; Motor
Carriers, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 775 (1960); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV; Air Car-
riers, 109 U. PA. L REV. 311 (1961); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control V; Production &
Distribution of Electrical Energy, 110 U. PA. L REv. 57 (1961); Hale & Hale, Competition
or Control VI; Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REV.
46 (1962); McGovern, Antitrust Exemptions for Regulated Industries, 20 FED. B.J. 10 (1960);
Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of
judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REv. 436 (1954).
9. In fact, the non-exclusivity of the rights and remedies under the securities laws, i.e., § 16
of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1958), 5 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 48 Star. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1958), suggests that the continued
applicability of the rights and remedies of the antitrust and other laws was intended.
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penetrating investigations. They intended no exemption to the Sherman
Act; and it is hardly probable that they would inadvertently accomplish
such a result.'0
Hence, any exemption of the securities field from the antitrust laws must
be implied, and any such exemption is limited to the extent necessary to
give effect to the purposes of the securities laws."
Federal regulation of the securities field was designed to curb existing
abuses." Although self-regulatory attempts by the nation's securities ex-
changes were proved inadequate," Congress nevertheless chose to create
a regulatory system which would continue, strengthen, and make more
effective self-regulation of securities exchanges subject to vigorous Com-
mission oversight. Self-regulation was originally advanced and included
in the pattern of federal control of the securities field on grounds of
practicality" and the potential ineffectiveness of direct governmental regu-
lation on a wide scale. 5 "The purpose of the self-regulation provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act was to delegate governmental power to
working institutions which would undertake, at their own initiative, to
enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal standards in a complex
and changing industry."'"
The analysis of the Report of the Special Study of the Securities
Markets7 discloses a threefold need for public supervision of self-regula-
tion. First, the need to provide assurance that the self-regulatory agen-
cies actually assume responsibility for and discharge the functions and
duties assigned to them is apparent. Second, as stated in the Special Study:
self-regulation by a member organization involves some degree of im-
pairment of competition and public control is necessary not only to
insure that such impairment is compensated for by effective regulation,
but also to insure that the kinds and extent of impairment are only such
and no greater than required by the exigencies of regulation. Inherent
in self-regulation is the "private" formulation of restrictive standards of
business conduct and their enforcement by, at the very least, exclusionary
practices. It is essential that the standards and their application not be
left to the unfettered discretion, or perhaps even lack of bona fide reg-
10. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See note 66 infre and
accompanying text
11. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
12. See Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025,
1027-36 (1934).
13. S. REp. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1934).
14. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special Study of the Securities Mar-
kets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 501 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Special Study].
15. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before House Committee on Interstate & For-
eign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1934).
16. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
17. Special Study, pt. 4, at 502.
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ulatory purpose, of the private regulators. The accommodation of various
public policies inherent in the formulation of appropriate standards and
their proper application cannot be abdicated by public authority.'8
Third, in some respects, self-regulatory agencies operate as quasi-public
utilities when viewed in relation to the general public, and in this capac-
ity require public oversight for much the same reasons as other utilities. "
Although the expertness and immediacy of self-regulation often provide
the most expedient and practical means of regulation, the system of self-
regulation provides its own problems of practicality and efficiency not
unlike those of direct governmental regulation.2" Certain fundamental
concepts regarding the relationship between the self-regulatory bodies
and the government are derived from the fact that in many respects the
regulatory agencies are official delegates of governmental power.2'
The need for assuring the effectiveness of self-regulation applies to the
entire regulatory process; the reserve of governmental authority assures
that the regulatory needs are fully and effectively met.22
The problem is one of reconciling the built-in, anticompetitive ef-
fects of self-regulation with the conflicting policies of the antitrust laws
within the framework of the regulatory scheme of the securities laws.
Two conflicting sets of statutory policies are involved - the policies of
the antitrust laws favoring the preservation and protection of competi-
tion, and the policies which underlie the statutory program of self-regula-
tion in lieu of direct governmental control.
National Securities Exchanges
The conflict emerges in two contexts: (1) when an exchange rule
on its face contravenes the statutory standard because of its anticom-
petitive consequences; and (2) when in carrying out their self-regulatory
obligations, the exchanges and their members are required to take con-
certed action, which, if not protected by the Securities Exchange Act,23
would result in a violation of the antitrust laws.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. The Special Study suggests that the exchanges in operating a market place for
public participants and by fixing minimum commission rates, and the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) in operating a retail quotation system are essentially conduct-
ing businesses affected with a public interest requiring public supervision and control; see also
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
20. Special Study, pt. 4, at 722.
21. Id. at 723.
22. Ibid.
23. The following provisions of the Securities Exchange Act are directly concerned with
national securities exchanges:
Section 5, 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1958), makes it unlawful to use the
mails or any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce for the purposes of using any
facility of an exchange to effect any transaction in a security, or to report any such transaction,
unless such exchange is registered pursuant to § 6, 48 Star. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f
[Vol 16:131
1964] Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws
The Commission has had only one occasion to weigh the anticom-
petitive effects of an exchange rule. That was in connection with a pro-
ceeding, pursuant to section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 4 in-
volving the "multiple trading rule" contained in the constitution of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which subjected members to
disciplinary action for acting as odd-lot dealers or specialists on other ex-
changes, or for otherwise dealing .publicly outside the exchange in se-
curities dealt in on the exchange. Because of the sweeping effect of that
provision upon otherwise lawful dual membership on securities exchanges
and the activities, of such members in dually listed securites, the Commis-
sion determined that enforcement of the exchange rule would have im-
peded the functioning of the regional exchanges as instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and would have curtailed or impaired existing chan-
nels for the distribution in interstate commerce of dually traded securities.
The Commission concluded, inter alia, "that the Rule would operate as an
unreasonable and unjustified restraint upon interstate commerce and that
enforcement of the Rule would violate one of the basic purposes of regu-
lation under the [Securities Exchange] Act, a purpose which is closely
related to the public policy regarding restraints and the maintenance of
fair competition as disclosed by Congress in the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act."2 5  The Commission ac-
cordingly altered the exchange constitution to authorize members to con-
(1958), or is exempt by reason of the limited volume of transactions effected thereon.
Section 6(a) provides that an exchange may be registered as a national securities exchange
by filing a registration statement which contains, inter alia, an agreement to comply, and to
enforce so far as it is within its powers compliance by its members, with the provisions of the
act and the rules and regulations thereunder. Section 6(b) prohibits registration of an ex-
change unless its rules include provisions for expulsion, suspension or disciplining of members
for conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and declare that willful
violations of the act and the rules thereunder are considered conduct inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade. Section 6(d) provides that in order to grant registration
to an exchange, the Commission must find that it is so organized as to be able to comply with
the provisions of the Act and rules thereunder and that its rules are just and adequate to insure
fair dealing and to protect investors.
Section 19(a) (1), 47 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
55 78s(c)-(d) (Supp. V, 1963), authorizes the Commission to take action which is necessary
or appropriate for the protection of investors to suspend for a period not to exceed twelve
months or to withdraw the registration of an exchange which it finds has violated the Act or
rules thereunder, or has failed to enforce, so far as within its powers, compliance therewith
by a member or the issuer of a security registered thereon. Section 19(a) (3) gives the
Commission power to suspend from membership for up to twelve months or to expel from
an exchange, a member who it finds has violated any provisions of the Act or rules thereunder.
Section 19(b) authorizes the Commission, after written request to an exchange to make
specified changes in its rules or practices, to alter or supplement the rules of an exchange by
rule, regulation or order in respect of thirteen enumerated categories of matters, when neces-
sary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing upon and admin-
istration of the exchange.
24. Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941) (the "multiple trading
case"); see Special Study, pt. 2, at 923.
25. Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270, 287 (1941).
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tinue to engage in the activities which the exchange had sought to
prohibit.
At the time of enactment of the Securities Exchange Act, it was gen-
erally established that the exchanges, in their capacity as self-regulatory
agencies, were amenable to antitrust jurisdiction in a variety of circum-
stances.26 Nevertheless, the exchanges were often successful in avoiding
the impact of the antitrust laws, receiving considerable latitude from the
courts in the management of their internal affairs.27 It was recognized that
the existence of every exchange or board of trade imposed some restraint
upon the conduct of business by its members. The controlling principles
were set forth in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States which
sustained a rule of the board of trade prohibiting transactions by members
in certain commodities after the close of trading hours at prices other
than the closing bid.
[TIhe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by
so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to re-
strain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the re-
straint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, all are relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences. 29
The problems involved in assuring against misuse of the delegated
power of self-regulation and in reconciling the anticompetitive conse-
quences of self-regulatory action were focused in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange.3" Silver, the principal of two over-the-counter brokerage
firms, and not a member of the exchange, had private wire connections
26. See generally MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES 60-64
(1931).
27. Thus, exchanges were permitted to withhold quotations, Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch. 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198
U.S. 236 (1905); to regulate prices for transactions between members after trading hours,
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917); to prescribe and enforce
minimum commissions for brokerage services, Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578
(1898); Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926); to prohibit members
from dealing with members of rival exchanges, Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604
(1898); and to prohibit members from dealing with nonmembers, Anderson v. United
States, supra; but ci. Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, supra, Some of the foregoing cases may
be of doubtful authority today.
28. MEYER, op. cit. supra note 26.
29. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917).
30. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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with various member firms and ticker service from the exchange, pur-
suant to temporary exchange approval." Without notice to Silver or
explanation to the member firms, the exchange ordered members to
discontinue wire connections with Silver and halted ticker service to
him." Silver thereupon sued for an injunction and for damages under
the Sherman Act.33 The Supreme Court held that the exchange was
liable to Silver for causing its members to terminate wire connections be-,
cause of the unfairness of the procedures followed by the exchange in
failing to give notice to Silver and for refusing to afford him the oppor-
tunity to meet the "charges" against him. The Court thus finessed the
broader question of the general applicability of antitrust concepts to the
securities field by grounding its decision upon the determination that
31. The rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) require approval of any such wire
connections. Silver's approval was "temporary," pending completion of an investigation of
his character and business reputation. Exchange rules further provide that members must
discontinue wire connections with nonmembers upon instructions from the exchange.
32. In accordance with exchange policy of not giving reasons for disapproval or withdrawal
of approval, Silver was not permitted to ascertain the reasons for the exchange's action, nor
to answer any accusations upon which it might have been based.
33. The complaint stated a claim under the Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
5 15 (1958), and § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 5 26 (1958), alleging a conspiracy
between the exchange and various member firms to deprive Silver of private wire connections
and ticker service to Silver's competitive disadvantage in violation of Sherman Act § 1, 26
Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1958). The other claims, sounding in tort,
were not considered by the courts.
The district court determined that there was no exemption from the antitrust laws for the
acts complained of. Without determining whether there was any exemption by reason of the
Securities Exchange Act with respect to matters directly concerning the business in listed se-
curities, the court saw the issue as confined to the over-the-counter market with respect to
which the exchange was not entitled to regulate the conduct of its members. The court stated:
Providing that its members do not indulge in conduct which is illegal or incom-
patible with just and equitable principles of trade, an exchange has neither the power
nor the authority to determine with whom its members may or may not deal or to
direct them to desist from dealing with nonmember broker/dealers engaged in trans-
actions in over-the-counter securities and munidpals. If it does so it does so at its
peril and is subject to such appropriate action as may be taken under the anti-trust
laws. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
The court of appeals held that the exchange's action was within its authority under the
Securities Exchange Act and therefore beyond the coverage of the Sherman Act. No justifi-
cation was found for the distinction between control by an exchange over members' dealings
in listed or other securities. The court concluded that in exercising the powers required by
the statute, the exchange must be immune or exempt from the restrictions and sanctions of
other legislation, namely the Sherman Act. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714
(2d Cir. 1962).
The early cases had established that quotation services could not be obtained without an
exchange's consent. E.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S.
236 (1905). It was also established that reasonable conditions could be imposed upon those
receiving quotations. There was disagreement among the state courts as to whether an ex-
change might discriminate among those to whom it furnished quotation services. New York
& Chicago Grain & Stock Exch. v. Board of Trade, 127 IM. 153, 19 N.E. 855 (1889). Contra,
In the Matter of Renville, 46 App. Div. 37, 61 N.Y. Supp. 549 (1899). In Moore v. New
Ylork Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926), the Supreme Court held that an exchange, in
exercising the ordinary right of a private vendor of news or other property, was not required
to furnish quotations on a non-discriminatory basis. See MEYER, op. cit. supra note 26, at
49-60.
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while "the action here taken by the Exchange would clearly be in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act unless justified by reference to the purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act ... that statute affords no justification for
anticompetitive collective action taken without according fair proce-
dures." 4  The Court concluded that by acting without according proce-
dural safeguards to Silver at his request, the exchange exceeded the scope
of its authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regu-
lation. There was thus no occasion for the Court to pass upon the suffi-
ciency of the reasons advanced by the exchange for its action; similarly,
there was no need for the Court to further define the substantive stand-
ards by which to justify the exchange's action on the merits.
The Court's rationale dealing with the problem of reconciling the
pursuit of eliminating restraints upon competition with the effective func-
tioning of the statutory policy which encourages self-regulation (recog-
nizing that it may have anticompetitive effects in general and specific
application) deserves careful note. Removal of the wire connections by
the collective action of the exchange and its members would, had it oc-
curred in a context free of other federal regulation, have constituted a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as a group boycott3" In
the absence of Commission jurisdiction to review particular instances of
enforcement of exchange rules, the issue was reduced to a determination
of the extent to which the character and objectives of self-regulation un-
der the Securities Exchange Act were incompatible with the maintenance
of an antitrust action. There is nothing in the regulatory scheme to
perform the antitrust function of assuring that exchanges do not apply
their rules in a manner injurious to competition and unjustified by legiti-
mate self-regulatory ends. By providing no agency check on exchange
behavior in particular cases, Congress left the regulatory scheme subject
to the influences of improper collective action over which the Commis-
sion has no express authority. Unbridled self-regulation must not be
34. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364 (1963). The court believed that
Congress could not have intended to sanction self-regulatory activity carried out in an unfair
manner. The Court stated:
The point is not that the antitrust laws impose the requirement of notice and a
hearing here, but rather that, in acting without according petitioners these safe-
guards in response to their request, the Exchange has plainly exceeded the scope of
its authority under the Securities Exchange Act to engage in self-regulation and
therefore has not even reached the threshold of justification under that statute for
what would otherwise be an antitrust violation. Id. at 364-65.
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, on the other hand, concluded that the existence of a
violation of the antitrust laws is not dependent upon whether the defendant's conduct was
arbitrary; he takes the position that the majority erred in using the antitrust laws to serve
ends which they were not intended to serve, ie., "to enforce the court's concept of fair pro-
cedures under a totally unrelated statute." Id. at 370.
35. That concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders is an unlawful restraint of
trade see, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955).
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permitted to cause competitive injury to issuers or nonmembers if beyond
the scope of the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act; some form of
review of exchange self-policing - by the administrative agency or the
courts - is not, in the Court's view, incompatible with the fulfillment
of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.
Since the antitrust laws serve, among other things, to protect competitive
freedom, i.e., the freedom of individual business units to compete unhin-
dered by the group action of others, it follows that the antitrust laws are
peculiarly appropriate as a check upon anticompetitive acts of exchanges
which conflict with their duty to keep their operations and those of their
members honest and viable. Applicability of the antitrust laws, there-
fore, rests on the need for vindication of their positive aim of insuring
competitive freedom. Denial of their applicability would defeat the con-
gressional policy reflected in the antitrust laws without serving the pol-
icy of the Securities Exchange Act.36
The existence of review of exchange self-regulation through a vehicle
other than the antitrust laws, i.e., review by the Commission and ensu-
ing judicial review of exchange disciplinary actions, as' there is under
the Maloney Act"7 with respect to registered securities associations, would
have presented a different case. The absence of Commission power to
review particular instances of self-regulatory action by exchanges creates
problems for the exchanges."
The entire public policy of self-regulation, beginning with the idea
that the Exchange may set up barriers to membership, contemplates that
the Exchange will engage in restraints of trade which might well be un-
reasonable absent sanction by the Securities Exchange Act. Without the
oversight of the Commission to elaborate from time to time on the pro-
priety of various acts of self-regulation, the Exchange is left without
guidance and without warning as to what regulative action would be
viewed as excessive by an antitrust court possessing power to proceed
based upon the considerations enumerated.... But, under the aegis of
the rule of reason, traditional antitrust concepts are flexible enough to
permit the Exchange sufficient breathing space within which to carry
out the mandate of the Securities Exchange Act... Although, as we
have seen, the statutory scheme of that Act is not sufficiently pervasive
to create a total exemption from the antitrust laws.., it is also true that
particular instances of exchange self-regulation which fall within the
scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as
justified in answer to the assertion of an antitrust claim.39
With respect to the broader question of the applicability of the anti-
trust laws to the securities field, the Court suggested that the proper ap-
proach to the case was an analysis which reconciled the operation of each
36. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963).
37. See note 43 infra.
38. The opinion thus intimated that certain self-regulatory activities of the exchange, be-
cause of the absence of Commission review, can still violate the antitrust laws. The court
refused to specify what such activities were. Nor did it indicate whether the existence of
Commission review would have obviated the question of whether the collective action in
withdrawing the wire service was exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.
39. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963).
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statute with the other, rather than concluding that one completely
ousted the other. Antitrust exemption is to be implied only if necessary
to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and then only to the minimum
extent necessary. Thus, the Court intimated that the exchange should
remain subject to the antitrust laws in the exercise of its self-regulatory
functions, at least until the intervention of antitrust policies impedes the
discharge of such responsibilities or hampers the fulfillment of the goals
of the Securities Exchange Act. No guidelines were offered to delineate
the boundaries of susceptibility or immunity of exchange action under
the antitrust laws. The only dear answer thus far is that self-regulatory
action taken without affording fair procedures is not immune. More-
over, the Court remained aloof from the underlying question of legisla-
tive policy: whether it is more appropriate for government oversight in
this area to be vested in the administrative agency or in the courts."0
Registered Securities Associations
The regulatory pattern of the federal securities laws was augmented
in 1938 by the Maloney Act amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act41 which extended the self-policing concept to dealers in the over-
the-counter securities market by providing for the registration of volun-
tary securities associations.4" A more ambitious program of government
oversight than that which prevails with respect to registered securities
exchanges was introduced, particularly the extension of the Commission's
jurisdiction to include review of association disciplinary actions.4" Sec-
tion 15A(n) provides that the provisions of section 15A are to prevail
over any other conflicting federal laws. While not specifically conferring
exemption from the antitrust laws, that section has nevertheless been
interpreted as providing some degree of antitrust immunity." It was
40. Special Study, pt. 4, at 707. As more fully considered below, the Special Study was of
the view that primary jurisdiction of this area should be vested in the Commission.
41. See 2 LOss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1359-91 (1961).
42. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) is the only such registered
national securities association. See generally 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 41; Special Study,
pt. 4, ch. XII-G.
43. Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(1958), provides for the registration as a national securities association of any association of
brokers or dealers which it appears to the Commission satisfies the provisions of that section.
In addition to making membership available to any broker or dealer not subject to statutory
disqualification under § 15A(b), the rules of the association must, inter alia, afford due
process type protection in any disciplinary proceedings. Commission review of disciplinary
action is expressly provided in §§ 15A(g) and (h), and as a concomitant of the require-
ment of pre-filing of association rules (now extended by Commission Rule 17a-8, 17 C.F.R.
5 2 4 0.17a-8 (1964), to exchanges) the Commission has authoriay to abrogate any association
rule, to assure fair dealing, fair representation of members, and to protect investors. Securities
Exchange Act §5 15A(j), (k).
44. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 809-10 n.16 (1961) (dis-
senting opinion, Frankfurter, J.); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
227 n.60 (1940); 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 41, at 1370.
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intended to be limited to the operation of section 15A(i) (1), which per-
mits the rules of an association to prohibit members from dealing with
nonmembers, except at the same prices, commissions, and fees, and on
the same terms and conditions as are accorded to the general public.45
Without a provision like section 15A(n), there presumably would have
been a serious question whether the preferred treatment of members
sanctioned by section 15A(i) (1) could escape conflict with the antitrust
laws.
46
In return for such exemption the policies of the antitrust laws, at
least, were made applicable to registered securities associations by reason
of section 15A(b) (7), which requires that the rules of such an associa-
tion be
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to provide safeguards
against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or
other charges, and, in general to protect investors and the public interest,
and to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination be-
tween customers or issuers, or brokers or dealers, to fix minimum profits,
to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any schedule or fix mini-
mum rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other charges.
The extension of the self-regulatory concept to over-the-counter dealers'
associations was designed to elevate that segment of the securities in-
dustry to a stature comparable to the registered exchanges.4 Never-
theless, different treatment of such associations under the antitrust laws
resulted; the broader jurisdiction of the Commission suggests the possi-
bility of a limited antitrust exception under the doctrine of the Silver
case.48  The "regulatory gap," i.e., the differences between the provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act dealing with the powers of the Commis-
sion with respect to securities exchanges as distinguished from those re-
specting the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) has long
been recognized. Its existence may lead to unwarranted differences in
the application of the antitrust laws to each type of self-policing agency.
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Underwriting and Distribution of Securities
Until 1943, it was generally assumed that the practice of resale price
maintenance,49 a concomitant of the technique of fixed price underwriting
45. See In the Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424, 478 n.9 (1945) (dissenting opinion, Com-
missioner Healy). It is clear that nonmembership was intended to carry economic sanctions.
46. Ibid.; 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 41, at 1370 nA1.
47. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 7-8, 11, 18-19 (1938).
48. The Commission at an earlier date appears to have rejected such a suggestion. See In the
Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945).
49. The practice typically involves an agreement among the underwriters and selling group
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of securities, was beyond challenge under the antitrust laws.5" In that
year, that assumption was shattered when, in the course of proceedings
before the Commission to review a group of NASD disciplinary actions,5
the fixed price method of distributing securities was attacked by the then
Division of Trading and Exchanges of the Commission and the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice52 on the ground that price
fixing agreements, regardless of their economic justification, were illegal
per se under the Sherman Act.53
Reviewing the Supreme Court cases holding price fixing illegal per
se under the Sherman Act,54 and tracing the history of modern underwrit-
ing techniques, the majority of the Commission pointed out that the
nature of securities markets renders price maintenance as to one security
during a short period of distribution distinguishable from a scheme af-
fecting long-term marketing of consumers' or other goods. Moreover, in
view of the history of the development of underwriting techniques, price
maintenance agreements and stabilization, which may be objectionable
in principal, were deemed necessary under existing conditions.55 Whether
members not to sell the offered securities below a fixed public offering price, except for the
usual reallowance to members of the NASD, and except for changes in price or removal of
price restrictions by the syndicate manager after the initial offering by reason of changed
market conditions. See 3 Loss, SEcuRrIEs REGULATION 1615 (1961).
50. Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4344,
H.R. 5065, H.R. 5832, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. V, 1361 (1942).
51. In the Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945); Note, Price Maintenance in the Dis-
tribution of New Securities, 56 YALE LJ. 333 (1947). The proceedings involved disciplinary
action by the NASD against numerous association members who violated resale price main-
tenance agreements in connection with a distribution in 1939 of bonds of Public Service
Company of Indiana for engaging in conduct inconsistent with "high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade," in contravention of the rules of the associa-
tion. The issue had been offered to the public during a period of international unrest and
the distribution process was exceptionally long in duration; as a result many of the participat-
ing underwriters and dealers engaged in transactions in disregard of the uniform selling price
and concession terms. The majority of the Commission concluded that if it were faced with
the question it would not prohibit price maintenance agreements. However, the NASD's
interpretation of its rules requiring adherence to price maintenance agreements was found to
be contrary to the provisions of § 15A(b) (7) and the Commission set aside the action
of the NASD. In that posture of the proceedings, the Commission was not compelled to
determine whether the price maintenance provisions violated the antitrust laws. Nevertheless,
in view of the arguments advanced it felt constrained to express its views on that issue.
52. The Department of Justice was granted leave to intervene. In the Matter of NASD, 15
S.E.C. 577 (1944).
53. The question of the application of the Sherman Act was properly raised as a matter to be
considered in the course of the Commission's functions under the Securities Exchange Act.
Under the circumstances, there was no anomaly for an administrative tribunal to express its
views on antitrust questions otherwise triable in the court. In the Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C.
424, 436; cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
54. E.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); United States v. So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927).
55. In view of the fixed price paid to the issuer and the relatively narrow spread, a successful
distribution requires a sale price at or close to the offering price; it was felt that some price
maintenance was justified to counteract selling pressure placed on the market by the distribu-
tion itself.
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the policy of the Sherman Act required price competition among those
engaged in a common economic undertaking under circumstances which
made it necessary for the participants to act in combination was believed to
be dependent upon the facts of the particular case,56 the focus of attention
being the extent to which the fixed price of the particular issue affects
the price of other issues or exceeds the competitive limits set by the
market affecting similar types of.securities. In light of the provisions of
the Securities Act which sanction fixed price offerings with allowances
and discounts,5" and the congressional policy which committed stabiliza-
tion practices to the Commission's jurisdiction,58 the opinion warned that
the decisions dealing with price fixing and price maintenance in other
commodities under the Sherman Act "must obviously be read with cau-
tion."59  Although it was recognized as unnecessary to decide the point,
the Commission was inclined to the position that the price maintenance
agreements involved were not illegal under the Sherman Act. A caveat
in the opinion emphasizes that the condusion was not to be taken to mean
that the Commission was of the view that the Sherman Act was not
applicable to the underwriting business.6" The Commission's views on
the application of the antitrust laws to the securities field were summar-
ized as follows:
The mere making of agreements containing provisions for a fixed of-
fering price, price maintenance and stabilization is not per se unlawful.
But; like many other contracts, these may be entered into and performed
under circumstances that amount to an unlawful suppression of competi-
tion. We have already noted'certain factors by which the lawfulness of
the 'syndicate may be judgedE611 Among these are: the size of the group
in relation to the size of the issue, the suppr~ssion of competition in
56. Among the relevant factors suggested w6re: the size of the distribution group in relation
to the size of the iisue; theparticular combination of powers reserred to those who dominate
the distribution; the length of time Provided in the contract for keeping the combination
together; the type and quality of 'the security, and the size and nature of the class of investors
to whom the distribution must be made. Iii the Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C.'424, 458 (1945).
57. One author concludes that because sales below the offering price contained in the pro-
spectus would make the prospectus false and misleading unless supplemented or amended, it
is impossible to carry out a fixed price underwriting without some form of agreement. "If
one reads the Securities Act of 1933, it is inconceivable that Congress thought that fixed-price
distributions were illegal when it enacted that statute." JENNiNGS & MARSH, SEcuRrrEs
REGULATION 668 (1963).
58. Because the regulation of stabilization was committed to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission by § 9 of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Star. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1958),
it was believed that Congress thereby removed that matter from the scope of the Sherman Act.
But see note 70 infra.
59. In the Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424, 452 (1945).
60. It was emphasized that the Commission was then much concerned about monopoly
abuses in the securities business as discussed in its opinions and the Congressional investiga-
tions. That concern in part prompted the promulgation of Rule U-50 under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1958), re-
quiring competitive bidding in the sale of securities of registered holding companies.
61. See note 56 supra.
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bidding or negotiating for the business, and the duration of a syndicate
dictated by the manager and major underwriters. 2
Before the proceedings were concluded, the so-called Reece bills63
were introduced in the House, but were never reported out of committee.
If enacted, these measures would have codified resale price maintenance
provisions in the securities laws and would have exempted the practice
from the antitrust laws."4 Nevertheless, the bills were later severely
criticized by one court as an ill-considered attempt to legalize certain
aspects of fixed price underwriting generally, without reference to the
circumstances of their use in particular cases.6"
Further attempts to apply the antitrust laws to investment banking
were made in 1947 when a civil action in equity under the Sherman Act
was instituted against seventeen of the leading investment banking firms
charging a conspiracy to monopolize the nation's securities business.66
62. In the Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424, 464 (1945). In a dissenting opinion, Com-
missioner Healy accepted the principle that price fixing was illegal per se and that the Miller-
Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), amending § 1 of the Sherman
Act relating to resale price maintenance under state fair trade laws, did not apply to securities,
or if it did, the securities involved were not brought within it, and agreed that underwriters
may combine under some circumstances in violation of the Sherman Act. However, the
existence and size of the syndicate was necessary to effect the distribution and was not in his
opinion a combination to lessen competition. The agreement to observe a fixed offering
price and not to cut that price for a reasonable period of distribution did not appear to Com-
missioner Healy to be price fixing or resale price maintenance within the Sherman Act cases.
Under the Commission's rules, underwriters are permitted to stabilize, obviously
in combination, to preserve a market price during a period of distribution, not merely
to observe an offering price. Here this agreement is merely that during an appropri-
ate period the underwriters and seller will not violate the terms of their common
undertaking. Why swallow a camel like stabilization of a market price and strain as
a gnat like a uniform offering price not to be broken during a period of primary
distribution? The one excuse for stabilizing, which everyone agrees is a form of
manipulation of market prices, is to protect a public offering during a period of pub-
lic distribution, in order to facilitate that distribution. How futile it is to permit
that and yet insist that those who have combined their capial and efforts in a com-
mon undertaking cannot agree to cut their own public offering price during a period
reasonably needed for the distribution process! Is that price to be protected by
stabilizing against all adverse outside influences and yet the price be breached by
those on the inside who are distributing the security? Are the underwriters and
distributors stabilizing against their own price cutting? Are they stabilizing against
their violations of their own contracts? Id. at 488-89.
63. H.R. 5233, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); H.R. 1676, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945)
(introduced by Congressman Reece of Tennessee).
64. Resale price maintenance agreements would have been required to be included in Item
16 of Schedule A of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 88 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(16) (1958).
The Securities Exchange Act would have been amended to prohibit price fixing and stabiliza-
tion of a public offering of securities in contravention of Commission rules and unless delivery
of the offered securities was accompanied by a summary of the fixed price and price main-
tenance agreements. These provisions were to have prevailed over any conflicting federal law.
65. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
66. United States v. Morgan, supra note 65; Carson, Some Abuses of Antitrust Prosecution:
The Investment Bankers Case, 54 MIcH. L. REV. 363 (1956); Howell, Competition in the
Capital Markets, Harv. Bus. Rev., p. 83, May-June 1953; Steffen, The Investment Bankers'
Case: Some Observations, 64 YALE L.J. 169 (1954); Whitney, The Investment Bankers' Case
- Including A Reply to Professor Steffen, 64 YALE L.J. 319 (1955); Steffen, The Invest-
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During the course of the proceeding, the government sought to amend
the complaint, contending that the provisions of syndicate agreements
relating to the public offering price, resale price maintenance, stabiliza-
tion and withholding commission dauses, uniform concessions and re-
allowances, and termination periods for the duration of the syndicate or
the continuance of price restrictions, were all illegal per se under the
Sherman Act."7 Judge Medina refused to permit the introduction of
these additional issues; however, because of the possibility that he might
have been in error, he set forth his views by way of dictum on the validity
of syndicate agreements generally."8 That portion of his opinion in
United States v. Morgan 9 first determined that there was nothing con-
spiratorial about the syndicate system in view of the history of its de-
velopment and that because the situation was sui generis, no precedent
required holding that syndicate agreements were illegal per se under the
Sherman Act. Applying the rule of reason, the fixed type of public offer-
ing of new securities was believed to give no offense to the Sherman Act
on the basis of the methods commonly used. This was not to be taken
to mean that in connection with a specific issue of securities, by reason
of the period of the continuation of the price restrictions, the number
and underwriting strength of the syndicate members, or the existence of
other factors, a finding that such agreements were illegal under the
Sherman Act might not be justified. Moreover, the court continued, vari-
ous provisions of the Securities Act recognize the syndicate technique of
securities distribution and the fixed price offering; stabilization, sanctioned
in connection with new issues, was viewed as having nothing to do with
price fixing in the sense of the Sherman Act cases; and stabilization gen-
erally was not outlawed, but was committed to Commission jurisdiction."0
Provisions in syndicate agreements respecting withholding of commis-
sions, concessions, and discounts or reallowances were all found to be
consistent with the registration requirements of the Securities Act, serving
ment Bankers Case: Observations in Rejoinder, 64 YALE L.J. 863 (1955); Whitney, The
Investment Bankers' Case: A Surjoinder, 64 YALE LJ. 873 (1955); Note, The Investment
Bankers' Case: The Use of Semantics to Avoid the Per Se Illegality of Price Fixing, 63 YALE
L.J. 399 (1954).
67. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
68. The legal questions under discussion "form an area of head-on collision between the SEC
on the one hand and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice on the other."
United States v. Morgan, supra note 67, at 694. The court suggested, quite appropriately,
that the satisfactory way to arrive at any definitive factual and legal conclusions which could
be tested by appeal to serve as precedent, would be to bring before a court the question of the
legality under the Sherman Act of a single group of agreements relating to a single securities
issue. This has never been done.
69. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
70. Judge Medina was in general agreement with the Commission's conclusions on the anti-
trust question. He did not, however, agree with the Commission's position that the statutory
provisions concerning stabilization operated to remove that problem from the antitrust laws.
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the purpose of contributing to orderly distributions. Thus, while the pro-
visions of securities laws did not amount to an implied exemption from
the provisions of the Sherman Act, "all those who worked together on
the formulation of [the federal securities] ... legislation went about
their task of integrating into the statutory pattern the current modes of
bringing out new securities issues then in common use by investment
bankers generally, with complete assurance that no violation of the
Sherman Act was even remotely involved."'"
Neither the Morgan opinion nor the Commission's earlier opinion
offers complete justification for the accommodation of such agreements
and practices under the antitrust laws.72 Each opinion declares that there
is no general exemption from the antitrust laws for the securities business,
but intimates that the provisions of the securities laws exhibit the inten-
tion by Congress to permit the existence of activities which in a different
context would violate the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, under appropri-
ate circumstances - apparently taking into account quantitative differ-
ences - each opinion warns that fixed price underwriting arrangements
could violate the antitrust laws. Logical consistency in applying the anti-
trust thesis advanced in the Morgan case and in the Commission's opin-
ion, would lead to the conclusion that the same antitrust treatment might
not be extended to the underwriting and distribution of securities exempt
from the registration provisions of the Securities Act which recognize the
fixed price offering technique and resale price maintenance.7 The exemp-
71. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Congressional recog-
nition of the existing underwriting practices does not alone justify the conclusion that all of
such practices were authorized for antitrust purposes.
72. The Commission was of the view that application of § 15A(b) (7), 52 Star. 1070
(1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958), as amended, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Aug. 20, 1964), involves concepts different from those under the antitrust laws and was
therefore able to conclude that economic and business realities justified application of the
rule of reason.
73. For example, the fixed price distribution of an intrastate offering or other exempt offer-
ing of securities, and the attendant price maintenance and other arrangements, free of the regis-
tration provisions of the Securities Act, would be stripped of the ostensible protections afforded
by those provisions. With respect to the intrastate exemption, local restraints of sufficient im-
portance to have interstate effects may be subject to antitrust action. United States v. Em-
ploying Lathers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 198 (1954); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). On the other hand, an offering made pursuant
to Regulation A under the Securities Act, which provides exemption for offerings up to
$300,000, would be protected under the theory of Morgan and the Commission's opinion.
The provisions of Regulation A recognize the attributes of the fixed price offering. More-
over, failure to adhere to the fixed price resulting in sales at a higher price would result in
loss of the exemption.
One writer has suggested that certain aspects of the private placement market which de-
veloped under the private offering exemption of the Securities Act § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77
(1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958), as amended, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964), namely, that issuers seeking to place their securities privately may
not offer them freely or the exemption will be lost; that business practice favors negotiated
rather than free, competitive offering; that issuers are forced to accept terms different from
those which would be available in a free market-, and that small institutional lenders are
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tive provisions of the securities laws justify no such difference in anti-
trust application. Legislative treatment along the lines of the abortive
Reece bills may have been appropriate. Not only would the antitrust
question have been obviated, but the Commission would have had direct
control over the matter through the registration process and rule making
authority.
Stock Exchange Commission Rate Structure
The avowed objectives of organizing the NYSE in 1792 were the
setting of minimum commission rates and the establishment of a prefer-
ence for members of the exchange in their dealings inter se.74 The level
and structure of commission rates are established by the rules of the
various exchanges, subject to the Commission's authority under section
19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. The structure of the NYSE
commission rate schedule, the antirebate rule and concomitant attempts
to avoid it, as well as certain reciprocal business and special service ar-
rangements, each involves practices which, unless otherwise sheltered by
the securities laws, suggest questions in the application of the antitrust
laws.
The NYSE commission rate schedule and the rules which govern it
establish a mandatory system of minimum commission rates for dealings
between members inter se and between members and nonmembers, " and
prohibit any rebate, return, discount or allowance."8 The rates of com-
mission contained in the member schedule are not only lower than those
contained in the single nonmember schedule, but also contain separate
schedules of charges for executing or clearing transactions or for both."
Nonmembers, on the other hand, including nonmember broker-dealers,
are subject to a higher all-inclusive commission schedule based upon a
fixed round lot rate, regardless of the number of round lots involved in
a transaction.
Under the public commission schedule of the NYSE, a- nonmember
broker must pay a member the same commission that his customer would
excluded from and cannot compete for the business of the large issuers - impose restraints
inconsistent with the policies of the antitrust laws. Such limited access to a market in any
other commodity would not be tolerated under the antitrust laws. See Steffen, The Private
Placement Exemption: What to Do About A Fortuitous Combination in Restraint of Trade,
30 U. Cm. L RV., 211 (1963). Professor Steffen suggests that the antitrust policy might
be satisfied by according special treatment to a recognized private placement market 'Id. at
239-40.
74. Special Study, pt. 2, at 295.
75. NYSE Constitution Art. XV, in Special Study, pt. 2, at 295-96. The Commission rate
structure of the NYSE is not only the most important in the country, but serves as the pattern
for the other national securities exchanges. Id. at 299.
76. On the other hand, three regional exchanges grant discounts to nonmembers. Ibid.
77. Id. at 297.
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pay if he were to place the order directly with a member. Yet the non-
member incurs, in addition to the commission cost, overhead and other
expenses incident to securing and transacting the business. Since com-
petition normally prevents the nonmember from charging his customer
any more than the rate charged by a member, his gross income from the
transaction generally equals the commission he pays to the member,
notwithstanding his other costs. Yet unless he accepts such NYSE bus-
iness placed with him by his customer, he runs the danger of losing both
customer and business altogether. 78
As a result of the prohibition against rebates of commissions to non-
members, there have been established a variety of ad hoc practices directed
at special treatment of nonmember professionals. 79 Although the return
of cash to nonmembers violates the antirebate rule, the return of a cash
equivalent in the form of commission business or services is permissible. 0
The Special Study describes several methods by which a member of the
NYSE desiring to reciprocate for commission business given to him by a
nonmember professional can return commission business to the non-
member."' Such business is usually placed under arrangements involving
proportions favoring the member firm. Alternatively, a member may,
with certain limitations, reward a nonmember for commission business
by furnishing him with special services, such as installation and main-
tenance of wire arrangements, clearance of non-exchange transactions,
office space, special research, promotional materials and displays - either
free of charge or at reduced cost. 2 Because the public schedules require
charging the same rates of commission based on the value of a round lot
regardless of the size of the transaction, special services varying in con-
tent, scope, and depth from those provided to ordinary public customers
are also used as a reward or an inducement for commission business of
large block or volume customers. These practices are generally geared to
circumvent the prohibition of certain special service arrangements by
NYSE rules.8 3 The permissive splitting of dollar commissions among
members has given rise to additional reciprocal arrangements character-
ized as give-ups, generally availed of by mutual funds, whereby a portion
of the commission on a transaction is paid over at the direction of the cus-
tomer to another member firm to satisfy the customer's purposes."4 Lastly,
78. Id. at 301.
79. Id. at 346-47.
80. Id. at 304.
81. Id. at 302-07. These arrangements include placing such business on a regional exchange
through the nonmember even though the member may also be a dual member, or the security
dealt in is dually listed; and placing orders in over-the-counter securities with the nonmember
even if the member is capable of effecting the transactions directly.
82. Id. at 307-09.
83. NYSE Rule 369, in Specia Study, pt. 2, 313-16.
84. Another variation of the reciprocal give-up involves payment of a portion of the cash
commission to another member as a conduit who renders services for a nonmember with
whom the customer wishes to reciprocate. Still another method involves business transacted
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the absence of direct price competition has resulted in competition among
exchange members in ancillary services such as furnishing research, in-
vestment advice and quotations, safekeeping of securities, and collecting
dividends. However, as indicated, while more costly special services are
offered to large customers, the average customer is, in effect, compelled
to pay for services which he may not want under circumstances where
he cannot take his business elsewhere to avoid such services or charges
for them.85
Within the framework of the commission rate structure, there is
some question whether the existence of these practices and activities is
compatible with the antitrust laws." For example, the commission rate
schedule, particularly the system establishing minimum rates of charge,
may constitute an illegal price fixing scheme - per se an unreasonable
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act." A schedule of maximum
commission rates or a minimum-maximum range may, strictly as a matter
of antitrust law, be viewed more favorably.88 Similarly, because of
limited access to exchange membership, and depending upon circum-
stances, the antirebate rule and reciprocal dealing arrangements may be
capable of construction as a form of group boycott, i.e., a concerted re-
fusal to deal.8"
on regional exchanges through a dual member who gives up a portion of the commission to 9
regional-only member, or on some regional exchanges even to a nonmember. See id. at
316-18.
85. Id. at 321.'
86. There appears to be no question of whether the activities involved concern trade or com-
merce within the jurisdiction of the antitrust laws. United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
87. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., supra note 86 and cases cited therein.
Note that the" early cases of Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) and Anderson
v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898), are not applicable.
88. "Obviously so drastic a step could not be taken, or even proposed, without much more
exhaustive examination of its potential advantages and disadvantages than could possibly have
been undertaken by the Special Study, arid the reference to it [there] is not intended as a
suggestion for action but only as a course of study. Yet it is appropriate to point out that
many of the knottiest problems of "rate structure and establishment of 'reasonable rates ...
might be enormously simplified if 'reasonable' rates were not necessarily conceived of as
minimum ones" Special Study, pt. 2, at 323. Note too that a maximum rate structure may not
be entirely beyond the pale of the antitrust laws. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
Section 3(a) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Star. 882 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78c (1958), as amended, Pub. L No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964),
defines the term "member" to include any person who may make use of the facilities of an
exchange upon payment of a commission or fee which is less than that charged the general
public. If commission splitting between members and nonmembers were permitted, arguably,
such nonmembers would fall within that definition, and under § 6, 58 Star. 885 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78q (1958), and § 19(a) (1), 48 Stat 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 5 78s (1958),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. V, 1963), the exchange would be responsible for their
conduct. Although it appears that Congress may thus have recognized the existence of the
antirebate practice, its status under the antitrust laws was not clarified.
89. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Compelling all customers to pay for ancillary set-
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Assuming for present purposes that each of the foregoing activities
and practices does in fact contravene the antitrust laws, it does not appear
that they are fully protected or given immunity under the securities laws
within the guidelines of the Silver case. Notwithstanding that the criti-
cized practices existed in some form prior to the enactment of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, Congress gave no clue as to whether it intended
merely to recognize the existence of the fixed commission schedules and
attendant practices, or whether it authorized such schedules for antitrust
purposes."0 Indeed, Congress and the drafters of the bills were con-
cerned with monopolistic abuses in the investment banking business and
acknowledged the monopoly position of exchanges and their member-
ship.91 Yet, there is nothing which discloses the manner in which it was
intended that particular practices were to be dealt with under the antitrust
laws. Early drafts of the bill would have empowered the Commission to
fix rates of commission directly. 2  However, under the Securities Ex-
change Act, the Commission's authority is confined to section 19 (b) (9),
which permits the Commission to alter or supplement rules of ex-
changes in respect to the fixing of reasonable rates of commission,
interest, listings and other charges, and similar matters. Early drafts
of the bill referred to uniform rates of commission,93 but the lan-
guage was changed without explanation to introduce the sole standard
of reasonable rates. That term is undefined and must be viewed through
the criteria of "protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securi-
ties traded in upon such exchange or to insure fair administration of
such exchange."94  Thus, to whatever extent section 19(b) obviates the
fixing of reasonable rates as a quantitative matter, it does not otherwise
purport to protect a minimum schedule as such; however, a broad reading
of that section would also permit the Commission to deal with the struc-
ture of commission rates. There are no provisions applicable to ex-
vices whether wanted by the customer or not, also appears to be a form of unreasonable re-
straint of trade.
In Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Civil No. 63-C-264, E.D. Wis., Octo-
ber, 1962, a nonmember broker-dealer filed an action on behalf of himself and all other
nonmember broker-dealers, alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade by the exchange and its
members in refusing to share or negotiate for sharing of commissions. If prosecuted to com-
pletion, that case may operate to put the antitrust question squarely before the Commission
and the courts.
90. In either event, the practice of furnishing special services to nonmember professionals
and large customers, and the practice of customer directed give-ups in cash or services, appear
analogous to the type of exclusive dealing and other discriminatory arrangements variously
prohibited by the antitrust laws.
91. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking & Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 7 (1938).
92. S. 2683, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 18(c) (1934); see Special Study, pt. 2, at 301.
93. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7705 (1934).
94. 48 Star. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 5 78s(b) (1958).
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changes similar to those contained in section 15A, which prohibit fixing
minimum profits or imposing schedules of prices or minimum rates of
commissions, allowances, discounts, or other changes.9" No comparable
provision expressly prohibits discrimination among customers, issuers, or
broker-dealers; but nothing authorizes and protects from the anti-
trust laws dealings by members with nonmember professionals except on
the same conditions as are accorded to the general public."
Strictly as a matter of antitrust law, the existence of so important
and pervasive a structure of commission rates ought to rest on a sounder
legal foundation. If there is sufficient economic justification to insist
upon a minimum rate structure, then clarification by way of a limited
antitrust exemption by statute would be appropriate. Otherwise, in the
absence of further regulatory control by the Commission, it would appear
that the present rate structure may be susceptible to antitrust enforce-
ment.
Restrictions Upon Members' Off-Board Trading in Listed Securities
One of the more striking recent developments in the securities field
is the growth of a market away from the stock exchanges for securities
traded in upon exchanges - the so-called "third market.""7  Although
the volume of such trading in NYSE listed securities is only a small
percentage of exchange volume, it nevertheless involves millions of dol-
lars annually. 8 The most important segment of such trading is carried
on by broker-dealers who make off-board markets in listed stocks on a
continuous basis.99 This market is generally viewed as a professional
market, i.e., composed of institutional customers attracted by the promise
of volume discounts and negotiated commissions, and nonmember dealers
who seek to utilize the third market to avoid the fixed exchange com-
mission schedule. From the point of view of the exchange market, the
third market is considered a form of multiple trading;" ° NYSE Rule
394 prohibits members from dealing in the third market in listed se-
curities without the consent of the exchange."'
It has been suggested 2 that with the prospective listing of bank stocks
95. Securities Act 5 15A(b) (7), 52 Star. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (7) (1958).
96. Sections 15A(b) (7), (i) (1), 52 Star. 1070 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1958), as
amended, Pub. L No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
97. Specal Study, pt. 2, at 870-911.
98. Id. at 873.
99. Id. at 870-71.
100. Le., a competitive market, and to the extent that it involves trading that would other-
wise take place in the primary market, it may affect the depth of the latter. Id. at 901-03.
101. The prohibition against over-the-counter dealings in listed securities by members is
followed in varying degrees by other exchanges. Special Study, pt. 2, at 900.
102. M. A. Schapiro & Co., To List or Not to List Part I, Bank Stock Q., September 1964,
p. 15.
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on the NYSE,' the attendant removal of members from dealings in
what will become the third market in such stocks may constitute a form
of concerted refusal to deal, prohibited by the antitrust laws, unless such
action can be justified by the Securities Exchange Act.' Such a refusal
to deal by exchange members, except in the primary exchange market,
may be defended as a reasonable means of preventing "erosion of the
primary market."'0 5  Such action may be justified as a concomitant of
the unique monopoly position of the exchange which is recognized by
the Securities Exchange Act. Although the success and quality of an
auction market may depend upon a concentration of orders in that
market, on balance the factor of competition that may be provided by
multiple markets must also be considered."'s
One of the aims of the scheme of regulation embodied in the Se-
curities Exchange Act was to "endeavor to create a fair field of compe-
tition among exchanges and between exchanges as a group and the
over-the-counter markets and to allow each type of market to develop in
accordance with its natural genius consistently with the public interest."'0 7
Thus, it may be appropriate in the public interest to extend the theory
of the multiple trading case' to include dual participation by members
in the third market. Moreover, the duty of a broker-dealer to obtain
the best price for his customer0 9 may outweigh any asserted justification
for continued restrictions upon members' dealings off-board.
The nature of the public interest in the maintenance of competition
within and among markets was summarized by the Special Study in
pertinent parts, as follows:
The extent of needed regulation of markets in the public interest
surely depends, at least in part, on the effectiveness of competition
among markets - not merely competition for the handling of trans-
103. The incentive to banks and other issuers of publicly held securities to list was created
by the Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (August
20, 1964), which extends the reporting and other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act,
heretofore applicable to listed companies, to publicly held corporations meeting the asset and
shareholder criteria.
L04. M. A. Schapiro & Co., supra note 102, at 19. The problem suggested is not peculiar to
hank stocks alone and would logically involve any listed security traded in upon the third
market. The crux of the problem is the exchange commission rate schedule. If rebates of
commission commensurate with prevailing discounts were permitted, it is possible that the
volume of the third market would dissipate.
105. Special Study, pt. 2, at 956. Exchange members are of course concerned about the
loss of commission business to the third market. Id. at 954-56; Silberman, Critical Examiua-
tion of SEC Proposals, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1964, pp. 121, 125-26. Moreover, the
restrictive rule is justified by the difficulties imposed on the exchange in policing the activities
of its members in listed securities off-board.
106. Special Study, pt. 2, at 956.
107. S. REP. No. 1739, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
108. Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
109.7 Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., I S.E.C. 909, 913 (1936); see Special Study, pt. 2, at
958?
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actions in multiple traded securities but competition to become the
primary market for particular securities - in maintaining high standards
of performance. Indeed, in the absence of effective competition among
markets in both senses, the sheer size and power of any one or two
markets might enlarge the scope and degree of needed governmental
intervention to the point where the adequacy of present regulatory con-
cepts would be open to question....
The factor of depth in the primary market thus must be looked at,
not in isolation, but in relation to the factor of competition. ... [I]t has
been concluded, not that impairment of depth in the primary market
is irrelevant or inconsequential... but that ... the public benefits of
competitive markets (including added depth in the total market which
they may provide) by and large outweigh any detriment in the form
of impairment of depth, in the primary market.t 1101 This conclusion
does not preclude the possibility that the balance would be otherwise in
particular instances. But, based on the study's analysis, the basic policy
would still be 'to create a fair'field of competition' among markets
and generally to foster free and open competition, rather than restrict
competition."'
Whether affected private interests or the government should intervene
to vindicate their respective interests with respect to existing restraints
upon member access to the third or other dual markets remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, the promotion of free and open competitive markets and
prevention of unfair competition involve a delicate .balance of competi-
tive factors which, unless the protection of the investing public requires
otherwise, would appear to favor free access to primary and secondary
markets.
Odd-Lot System
Nearly ten per cent of the share volume on the NYSE, and a higher
proportion of transactions, consists of odd-lots."1  The conduct of the
110. The existence of the third market apparently does not seriously impair the depth, of
the exchange market. It provides volume in listed securities not otherwise available, and of-
fers a medium for handling transactions too large to be effidently handled by exchange capac-
ity. Speciai Study, pt. 2, at 902-03. The competive advantages brought about by the -third
market include price competition which exists through volume discounts, and avoidance by in-
stitutional customers with their own advisory and other fadlities of fixed commission rates
for unnecessary services. The Speci4 Study noted in this regard that, "it might be said that in
this respect the market makers [ie., dealers in the third market) who incur none of the costs in-
volved in performing these services compete with the exchange by not performing the services
and by not charging for them." Id. at 905. Moreover, competition permits the nonmember
professional to do business in listed stocks without paying public commission rates;, although
this may be moderated by reciprocal arrangements. Ibid. Nevertheless, the third market
allows nonmembers to offer listed securities to customers which would not otherwisebe possi-
ble, thereby encouraging sharper competition among brokers to the ultimate benefit of the
public. Competition also exists in the form of faster executions and by allowing institutional
customers tighter control over their market activities. Id. at 905-06.
111. Id. at 957.
112. Speda Study, pt 2, at 172, 199. Odd-lots consist of transactions in fewer shares than
the minimum round lot trading unit. A round lot usually consists of 100 shares. Id. at 171.
This discussion is confined to the NYSE. On most other exchanges, odd-lots are handled by
specialists in their respective stocks. Id. at 172-73.
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odd-lot business is significant to the public investor, particularly the
small investor. Nevertheless, two firms dominate the odd-lot business,
handling almost ninety-nine per cent of the volume of NYSE odd-lots.11
These two firms, together with the floor brokers who work exclusively
for them, comprise about ten per cent of the exchange membership." 4
The odd-lot differential or fee, over and above the minimum commission
charges, is fixed by the odd-lot dealers and is not regulated directly by
the exchange." 5 Until recently, exchange policy consisted of a virtual
prohibition of price competition by members in odd-lot differentials and
enabled the present duopoly to flourish." 6 Unlike the odd-lot differen-
tial which has been determined cooperatively, a form of competition does
exist in the services offered by the odd-lot firms."7
The Commission's rule-making power under section 11(b) and its
authority under section 19(b) with respect to odd-lot dealers has never
been exercised. The exchange has now adopted rules governing activities
of odd-lot dealers."' However, pending the completion of an odd-lot
cost study and a determination by the exchange of what constitutes a
reasonable differential, the odd-lot differential continues to be that im-
posed by the odd-lot dealers." 9 Thus, there has persisted a monopoly
within a monopoly with the power to fix prices with respect to odd-lots.
The impact of current self-regulatory measures cannot yet be fully ap-
praised; it is possible that the antitrust question respecting odd-lots may
thereby be clarified.' °
Open-end Investment Companies
Open-end investment companies, commonly known as mutual funds,
have in recent years experienced extraordinary growth and popularity.'"
The Special Study attributes these phenomena in part to two unique
aspects of mutual funds - the continuous public offering of mutual
fund shares and the redeemability of such shares' - which are circum-
113. Id. at 173.
114. Id. at 174.
115. Id. at 181.
116. Id. at 179.
117. Id. at 186.
118. The exchange had adopted few rules respecting odd-lots. Id. at 177-78. The addition
of NYSE Rules 99, 100 and 124, effective June 1, 1964, introduced controls with respect to
transactions in odd-lots.
119. NYSE Rule 125.
120. In view of the suggestion and the possibility of automating the handling of odd-lots,
the problem concerning odd-lot dealers may be completely obviated. See Special Study, pt. 2,
at 202; Wall Street Journal, Sept. 24, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
121. Concerning mutual funds generally, see Special Study, pt. 4, ch. XI; Securities and
Exchange Commission, A Study of Mutual Fuuds, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton School Report].
122. Special Study, pt. 4, at 95-96.
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scribed by the provisions of the Investment Company Act. Certain activi-
ties and practices carried on in connection with the distributon of mutual
fund shares appear to be insulated from the operation of the antitrust
laws. Mutual fund shares, not generally traded on an exchange or over-
the-counter, are sold as part of a continuing and unlimited offering of
new shares by the fund through a principal underwriter and are redeemed
by the fund, as required by the Investment Company Act, both at prices
related to "net asset value."' "m The process of distribution of mutual
fund shares frequently takes place through independent broker-dealers
serviced by the fund's principal underwriter.'24 The principal under-
writer is often affiliated with the fund's investment adviser, broker-
dealers, or affiliates of one or the other.'25
The sales pressure in connection with the distribution of mutual fund
shares which concerned the Special Study was noted to have resulted,
at least in part, from the protection afforded by resale price maintenance,
or "fair trading" of mutual fund shares under the Investment Company
Act, NASD rules, and private sales agreements. To prevent price dis-
crimination among buyers and to assure the orderly distribution of mutual
fund shares, the Investment Company Act requires the maintenance of
the announced public offering price." That act prohibits sale of the
fund's shares to the public by either the fund or the principal underwriter
or dealer, except at the current offering price as described in the pro-
spectus."' The NASD is authorized to prohibit members from purchas-
ing mutual fund shares from a mutual fund or its principal underwriter,
except at the public offering price less the prescribed discount. 2 An
NASD rule prohibits sales by the principal underwriter at a discount to
anyone other than an NASD member, and then only when a sales agree-
ment which specifies the dealer's concession is in effect.'29
123. Id. at 96-97. Net asset value is computed twice daily and consists of the fund's net as-
sets per share. To minimize abuses such as dilution of the equity of existing shareholders,
S 22 (a) of the Investment Company Act empowers the NASD to adopt rules to prescribe
methods for computing prices at which members may buy, sell or redeem mutual fund shares
and the minimum time which must elapse between purchases and redemptions. The NASD
is also authorized to adopt rules limiting and prescribing methods of computing commissions
on mutual fund transactions. Investment Company Act § 22(b). See 1 Loss, SECURrlIES
RGu LA7Io 403 (1961).
124. Specia Study, pt 4, at 105-07. Other funds are distributed through integrated selling
organizations. Id. at 102-04.
125. Id. at 97.
126. 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 123, at 404-05.
127. Investment Company Act, § 22(d), 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d)
(1958). See Greene, The Uniforr Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 37 U. DET. LJ. 369 (1960).
128. Investment Company Act, § 22(b), 54 Star. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)
(1958).
129. NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, 5 26(c). Sales agreements'under the Investment
Company Act and NASD rules provide for a retail price of net asset value plus a specified
sales charge.
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In theory, without these fair trade arrangements, a trading market for
mutual fund shares could exist, with purchasers buying at prices below
the prices stated in the prospectus (net asset value plus, say, 8.5 per
cent) and sellers selling at prices above the contractual redemption price
(net asset value). Prior to the passage of the Investment Company Act,
indeed, there was such a market. The fair trade arrangements estab-
lished by the act, the NASD rules and the private sale agreements now
make it extremely difficult for a trading market in mutual fund shares
to exist and to provide competition for the large mutual fund selling organi-
zations in the sale of fund shares. While the overall economic desirability
of such fair trade arrangements from the point of view of the public
may well merit further consideration by the Commission, the Special
Study has been able to do no more than note that in the protection they
grant to large sales organizations, they contribute to the pressure for sales
of mutual fund shares.180
The scheme of the Investment Company Act, regarding the distribution
of mutual fund shares and price maintenance, would appear to offer an
implied exemption from the operation of the antitrust laws to the extent
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Investment Company Act.'
Moreover, under the doctrine of the Silver case, added protection for
these activities and practices is found in the self-regulatory participation
of the NASD through its rules and regulations subject to Commission,
and ultimately judicial, control. As the Special Study indicated, another
equally important contributor to the pressure for sales of mutual fund
shares is the NYSE minimum commission schedule which makes possible
the reciprocal business arrangements developed to avoid the antirebate
provision. Give-ups and other reciprocal business arrangements, more
fully described above, are most frequently employed by mutual funds.'
32
Unrestrained, these practices appear to be susceptible to anticompetitive
abuses and, under appropriate circumstances, may operate to the comped-
tive disadvantage of nonparticipating dealers.
130. Special Study, pt. 4, at 98.
131. Although § 10 of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §
80a-10 (1958), imposes certain limitations upon the complexion of the board of directors
of registered investment companies, including the requirement that 40% of the board of direc-
tors be independent of the investment adviser, there is no limitation upon affiliatioas and in-
terlocks between investment companies. (The Wharton School Report, at 69-73" describes
affiliation and control of multi-firm groups). If the same person representing an investment
adviser were to occupy a place upon each board of directors of two competing investment com-
panies, there would appear to be a possible violation of § 8 of the Clayton Act unless such
conduct is insulated therefrom by reason of the provisions of the Investment Company Act.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act generally prohibits the same person from being a director of
two or more competing corporations with capital in excess of $1,000,000 if elimination of
competition between them would violate the antitrust laws. See United States v. W. T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); Schectman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957);
United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Kramer, Inter-
locAking Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950). There
is some question as to the effect of different persons representing the same firm on different
boards of directors, a practice common among the investment banking community. See
Kramer, supra at 1272.
132. Special Study, pt. 4, at 213. See note 84 infra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion emphasizes two of the problems involved
in the process of balancing and accommodating the policies of the anti-
trust laws within the framework of federal securities regulation. First,
strict application of the antitrust laws to at least certain areas of the se-
curities field tends to produce anomalous results. For example, self-regu-
lation is vulnerable to the per se theory of antitrust liability because of
the many concerted activities which are carried on by the self-policing
agencies and because of the intrinsic anticompetitive bias recognized in
the concept of self-regulation. The possibility of antitrust liability in
connection with the fixed price method of underwriting securities has
not been entirely eliminated as a matter of law. Yet, in the proper eco-
nomic setting, insistence upon literal application of classical concepts of
competition and free markets may not be desirable in light of this and
other industry practices. Second, there exists simultaneously an area
within which the public interest, vis-4-vis the antitrust laws, may not- be
completely vindicated by the regulatory scheme of the federal securities
laws. Thus, there is a demonstrated need to accommodate the goals of
the antitrust laws to eliminate restraints upon competition, with the
efficient functioning of the self-regulatory program envisaged, by the
federal securities laws. Although there are built-in anticompetitive
effects in the self-regulatory concept, there is nothing built into the regu-
latory scheme which directly performs the antitrust function of guard-
ing against the misuse of the delegated power of self-regulation. It is
universally conceded that some form of government oversight and re-
view of the self-policing efforts of the self-regulatory agencies is necessary
to fulfill the purposes of the securities laws as well as the antitrust laws.
"Whether the antitrust laws apply, some government oversight is war-
ranted, indeed, necessary, to insure that action in the name of self-regula-
tion is neither discriminatory nor capricious. '
It has been suggested that the self-initiating regulatory process can
operate effectively only if it is free of the constant threat of antitrust lia-
bility, and that the securities laws remove from the sweep of the antitrust
laws the activities of the self-regulatory bodies in the required exercise of
their statutory responsibilities."' 4 Recognizing that under some circum-
stances it may *be in the public interest to substitute other values (e.g.,
liquidity, continuity, stability) for free price competition, limited antitrust
exemption, not unlike that contained in the Reece bills, may be appropri-
ate.x"5 Similarly, certain other activities may warrant special antitrust treat-
133. Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.AJ. 244, 246 (1963).
134. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
135. Several federal regulatory statutes provide shelter from the antitrust laws with respect to
particular matters vested in administrative jurisdiction, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat.
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ment; however, total exemption seems inappropriate and unnecessary.'
Surely, the proponents of complete antitrust exemption do not envisage total
relief from the policies of the antitrust laws without an appropirate sub-
stitute. Unjustified anticompetitive conduct in the name of self-regula-
tion under the securities laws should not be exempt from the sanctions
of the antitrust laws. Misuse of the delegated power of self-regulation
should be amenable to relief not otherwise available under the securities
laws."' The corollary of such exemption must be the substitution of a
scheme of government oversight more complete in scope than that pres-
ently conceived, but which will continue and strengthen the vitality of
the concept of self-regulation.'
The difficulties involved in lengthy antitrust litigation mitigate
against commending the use of that means of regulating anticompetitive
conduct in the securities field. Further, the intervention of antitrust pro-
ceedings by private litigants or government agencies might tend to im-
pair the efficient discharge by the Commission of its responsibilities, and
would result in the diminution of the initiative and responsibility of the
self-regulatory agencies. Effective functioning of self-regulation with due
regard for all aspects of the public interest, as the Special Study pointed
out, requires that the forum for review of self-regulatory action be the
agency already established as the official, expert guardian of the public
interest in the securities field - the Commission.
With its broad responsibility and concern for the entire area, it is in
the best position to comprehend and reconcile - in the first instance
and subject to judicial and congressional oversight of its own activities
- the diverse factors and considerations that may constitute or bear
upon the total public interest in the manifold and complex circumstances
where the question may arise. This is true of questions of competition
and all other aspects of the public interest, as well as questions of recon-
cilement of private interests. For an orderly and coherent regulatory
scheme, with self-regulation playing its intended role, needed govern-
mental oversight ought to be fragmented as little as possible. This is,
380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958), 62 Star. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. 5
5b(9); Shipping Act, 39 Star. 733 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
5 814 (Supp. V, 1963); Federal Communications Act, 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C. S 222,
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. V, 1963).
136. It has been suggested that absolute immunity would permit the existence, under some
other guise, of conduct and activities designed to achieve anticompetitive results; and the
obverse of such immunity would be unredressed injury to the victims thereof. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 38-39, Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341
(1963). Moreover, a proliferation of exemptions from the antitrust laws may not be de-
sirable from an antitrust standpoint. See AT'Y GEN. REP. 288.
137. Cf. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944);
Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) recognizing an implied
right of action for negligent violation of § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act by an exchange
for failure to take disciplinary action against its members.
138. See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTBMP. PROB. 663, 689 (1964).
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indeed, one of the basic roles of a specialized agency created to deal with
a particular industry affected with a public interest. 39
The majority opinion in the Silver case concluded that the Securities
Exchange Act did not create a total antitrust exemption. Nevertheless,
the Court intimated that particular instances of self-regulatory action fall-
ing within the scope and purposes of the act may be justified in answer to
the assertion of an antitrust claim. 4 ' In that light, "governmental par-
ticipation is necessary ... to assure that action taken in the name of
self-regulation fairly serves a valid public purpose and is not for a pur-
pose inimical to antitrust or other public policies; and conversely, that
bona fide self-regulatory action is not inhibited because of a risk of lia-
bility in the absence of Commission review."'' In an endeavor to obvi-
ate the problems raised by the Silver decision, the Special Study suggested
several measures designed to extend the scope of possible antitrust justi-
fication.
The Supreme Court took the position that the Commission's powers
under section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to request and direct
changes in exchange rules impliedly carries with it the power to disap-
prove exchange rule proposals. 4 ' Accordingly, the Special Study recom-
mended that all proposed rules be filed by exchanges sufficiently in ad-
vance of their effectiveness, similar to the requirements applicable to the
NASD.'43 It was assumed in the Silver opinion that the Commission
would have had the power under section 19(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act to direct the exchange to adopt a rule providing a hearing
and attendant procedures to nonmembers. 4 ' To be consonant with
antitrust principles, such a rule would have to provide a minimum of
procedural safeguards. The Special Study recommended that exchanges
adopt rules designed to afford such procedures in all proceedings with
respect to members, employees of members, issuers, and nonmembers.' 4
139. Special Study, pt. 4, at 707.
140. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see note 39 supra and accom-
panying text. In the absence of concurrent agency and court jurisdiction, this conclusion in-
volves more than an application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Conduct necessary to
carry out duties imposed by a regulatory statute cannot form the sole basis of antitrust claim.
ATr'Y GEN. REP. 282-83.
141. Special Study, pt. 4, at 726.
142. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). Whether this was in-
tended to apply only within the context of § 19(b) or more broadly is not dear. Special
Study, pt. 4, at 711 n.588.
143. Id. at 727. This recommendation was implemented by Rule 17a-8, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7253, March 3, 1964, CCH FED. Sac. L. REp. § 76,973 (Transfer Binder
1961-64), which requires the pre-filing of exchange rule proposals not less than three weeks
prior to effectiveness except under emergency circumstances.
144. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364 n.16 (1963). In the absence of
any such rule, and in light of the utility of such a rule as an antitrust matter and its compata-
bility with securities regulation principles, the Supreme Court saw no incompatability with
the Commission's power inherent in the announcement by an antitrust court of the rule.
145. Special Study, pt. 4, at 727. The NYSE has apparently made efforts to make hearing
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It further suggested that Commission review of at least certain types of
exchange disciplinary matters, in the manner applicable to the NASD, be
made available by means of a statutory amendment, if necessary."4 6 The
Special Study also suggested that the regulatory gap, i.e., the differences
between the statutory provisions defining the Commission's powers in re-
spect of exchanges and of those applicable to the NASD, be re-examined
within the framework of the principles of self-regulation and the Silver
decision.'47
In the past, when confronted with the opportunity, the Commission
has attempted in the administration of the securities laws to give effect to
the aims of the antitrust laws. There is an implicit recognition that the
public interest under the securities laws includes the vindication of the
policies of the antitrust laws in appropriate circumstances. More com-
plete exercise by the Commission of all of its powers would be desirable
and may be sufficient to implement the recommendations of the Special
Study. Although the Special Study was not prepared to suggest further
legislative changes, it was acknowledged that legislative changes would
unquestionably contribute to a more complete and logical pattern of rela-
tionships between the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies, and
would provide the most expeditious resolution of the issues raised by the
Silver decision.'48 Elimination of the substantive differences in the pro-
visions of the Securities Exchange Act governing the exchanges and
registered securities associations will serve to obviate the difference in
treatment of each type of self-regulatory agency under the antitrust laws.
In addition, with a view to affording the maximum initiative to the self-
regulatory institutions, the Commission's residual powers should be aug-
mented to permit it when necessary to administer the policies of the
antitrust laws within the regulatory framework of the securities laws. 49
So equipped, the Commission, with appropriate assistance from the self-
regulatory agencies, will be able to cope effectively with the problems
suggested by the Silver case.' Implementation of these measures will
vindicate the public interest in a setting compatible with the objectives
of the antitrust laws and of the federal securities laws.
procedures more readily available than heretofore. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 29, 1964, p.
16, cols. 4 & 5.
146. Special Study, pt. 4, at 727-28.
147. Id. at 726-27.
148. Id. at xvi.
149. Cf. Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regu-
lated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 46, 57-59 (1962).
150. This approach will permit a broader spectrum of Commission oversight and may re-
quire the Commission to define the substantive standards to govern the justification of ex-
change action in response to an antitrust claim on the merits. It was unnecessary for the
Supreme Court to do so in Silver. At the same time, this approach gives effect to the antitrust
laws in those areas not carved out from them by more specific regulation. Accord, S. S. W.,
Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1951); ATn'y GEN. REP. 282.
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